Bank-Tax Conformity for Corporate Income: An Introduction to the Issues by Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY FOR CORPORATE INCOME:









We appreciate helpful comments from Ed Maydew, Jim Poterba, Doug Shackelford, Doug Skinner, and
Joel Slemrod. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 © 2005 by Michelle Hanlon and Terry Shevlin.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.  Baak-Tax Conformity for Corporate Income: An Introduction to the Issues
Michelle Hanlon and Terry Shevlin
NBER Working Paper No. 11067
January 2005
JEL No. K34, M41, E62, G14
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the issues surrounding the proposals to conform financial accounting income
and taxable income. The two incomes diverged in the late 1990s with financial accounting income
becoming increasingly greater than taxable income through the year 2000. While the cause of this
divergence is not known for certain, many suspect that it is the result of earnings management for
financial accounting and/or the tax sheltering of corporate income. Our paper outlines the potential
costs and benefits of one of the proposed "fixes" to the divergence: the conforming of the two
incomes into one measure. We review relevant research that sheds light on the issues surrounding
conformity both in the U.S. as well as evidence from other countries that have more closely aligned
book and taxable incomes. The extant empirical literature reveals that it is unlikely that conforming
the incomes will reduce the amount of tax sheltering by corporations and that having only one
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper discusses the issues surrounding the proposal to conform financial accounting 
(book) income and taxable income. We review recent literature that sheds light on this proposal 
in order to inform the policy debate regarding what to do about the current divergence between 
financial accounting and taxable incomes. The expanding divergence between book and taxable 
incomes has attracted much attention and analysis in recent years (e.g., Plesko 2002; Desai 2003; 
Mills et al. 2002). The real concern with diverging book and tax incomes is not that they are 
different per se, but that the difference may be caused by some misleading or even fraudulent 
activity on the part of firms in reporting book income, taxable income, or both.
1 While there is 
little debate that the incomes are diverging, the cause of the divergence and whether and how to 
fix it are very much open questions. One proposal to fix the system is to conform the financial 
accounting (book) and taxable income numbers. For example, Yin (2001) in response to the 
Treasury’s white paper entitled “The Problem with Corporate Tax Shelters” claims that one way 
to solve the “problem” is to tax public corporations on their income reported for financial 
reporting purposes, as adjusted by tax rules authorizing specific deviations from that base (p. 26). 
Further, Desai (2004) argues that the dual reporting of corporate income has led to a degradation 
of corporate profit reporting and “…conforming the measurement of book and tax profits could 
provide firms with some automatic incentives to reduce tax avoidance and to be less aggressive 
in reporting profits to capital markets” (p. 3).  Our paper reviews much of the literature in this 
area, provides an overview of book-tax differences and their disclosure, discusses the proposed 
                                                 
1 Mills (1998) finds that the larger the level of book-tax differences, the greater the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
audit proposals and adjustments.  Lev and Nissim (2004) and Hanlon (2005) both provide evidence that large book-
tax differences are associated with lower quality of financial accounting earnings.  Thus, there is evidence that book-
tax differences can indicate both aggressive tax behavior and aggressive financial accounting reporting.    3 
“solutions” to the “problem,” and most specifically discusses the issues surrounding conforming 
financial accounting income and taxable income to one measure.   
There have been three proposed solutions regarding the increasing divergence between 
the two incomes put forth by regulators, academics, and the press.
2 The first is to require firms to 
disclose their entire tax return so that investors can compare the two sets of reports and from this 
comparison arrive at a more accurate measure of performance for the firm. The second 
suggestion is to have firms disclose only certain items from the tax return such as the amount of 
taxable income and tax liability, because currently the financial statements do not include this 
information.
3 The third proposal is to conform the two incomes; that is eliminate the book-tax 
differences that exist under the current system. Prior literature has discussed the first two 
proposals in detail.  Lenter, Shackelford, and Slemrod (2003; hereafter LSS) argue that the case 
for disclosure of the entire tax return is unappealing because it could cause companies to dilute 
the information on the tax return, hampering tax enforcement.  In addition, disclosing the entire 
return may reveal proprietary information and otherwise private business information to the 
firm’s competitors.
4 LSS argue that the case for limited disclosure of tax return information 
(such as bottom line taxable income or a more detailed reconciliation between book and taxable 
                                                 
2 There is also a fourth possible solution and that is to increase the disclosures required under Financial Accounting 
Standard 109 Accounting for Income Taxes to provide better information about the book-tax differences of the firm 
and the firm’s actual tax liability.  We do not discuss this solution further but the interested reader is referred to 
Hanlon (2003) for more details.  
3 One way to accomplish such disclosure would be to require public disclosure of the new Schedule M-3.  The M-3 
is a more detailed (than the Schedule M-1) reconciliation of book to taxable income effective for any taxable year 
ending on or after December 31, 2004 and must be filed by any corporation required to file Form 1120, U.S. 
Corporation Income Tax Return, that reports on Form 1120 at the end of the corporation’s taxable year total assets 
that equal or exceed $10 million.  The new M-3 is designed to increase transparency for IRS agents and make tax 
reporting requirements more uniform. Currently, this new schedule is confidential and not publicly available and 
thus will not help financial statement users. 
4 LSS state that the proprietary information that may be disclosed through tax returns includes the nature, sources, 
and character of a company’s revenues and expenses, details about a company’s legal structures, licensing, and 
leasing revenues by legal entity and jurisdiction, advertising and other selling expenses, and the nature and location 
of a company’s manufacturing costs by functional type (page 823).   4 
incomes) is more compelling because it could contribute to the transparency of the tax system. 
Our paper focuses mainly on the third proposal – the conforming of book and taxable incomes.
5   
In sum, there are both potential benefits and potential costs of conforming the two 
measures of income. For example, in terms of potential benefits, it is likely that corporations 
would incur less compliance cost in terms of reporting because they would report (essentially) 
the same measure to both the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Further, many argue that the temptation on the part of executives to 
mislead/lie for either financial accounting or taxable income purposes would be significantly 
reduced or even eliminated. Executives would be less inclined to overstate financial accounting 
income because this would result in higher taxes, and they would not want to understate taxable 
income because this would result in lower income reported to creditors and shareholders. Finally, 
conforming the incomes would likely simplify a currently very complex reporting environment 
where both investors and the Treasury are left to decipher how a firm can report stunning profits 
to investors yet show losses on their tax return.
6 
However, there are many potential costs to be considered as well.  An important one, 
which is often overlooked, is the loss of information to the capital markets. Clearly, however, 
this depends on how the conforming of the incomes is accomplished.  For example, would 
financial accounting income be conformed to tax or taxable income conformed to financial 
accounting? We believe that the latter is unlikely because Congress would then be leaving the 
Treasury’s revenue determination in the hands of the private sector Financial Accounting 
Standard’s Board (FASB). As further support of this claim we point to the recent controversy 
                                                 
5 We recognize that various proposals to overhaul the income tax system entirely (e.g., a consumption tax) would 
render the proposal of conforming book and tax incomes meaningless because with a consumption tax there will no 
longer be a taxable income with which to compare financial accounting earnings.   
6 Regarding these cases Representative Lloyd Doggett stated that “when investors hear of only rosy earnings while 
at tax time Uncle Sam only hears of regrets and red ink, something is very wrong” (Weisman 2002, p A01).   5 
over stock option expensing (which we discuss further below); Congress involved itself in this 
issue with no tax revenue implications indicating it is unlikely to relinquish control over items 
concerning tax revenues to another body. Another alternative is just to reduce significantly the 
number of book-tax differences allowed (Yin 2001). Consistent with the work by George Stigler 
(1971) which provides that regulators are often captured by the regulated enterprises, promoting 
the interests of the firms instead of the common good, we conjecture that with this proposal it is 
likely that additional differences would soon be added to please every special interest group and 
constituency and, as a result, we would soon be back to a system with innumerable adjustments. 
Thus, if the two incomes were conformed, the conformed number reported would be (or 
approach) taxable income as defined under the current system. If that is the case, then the current 
financial accounting measure of performance would not be available to the markets and recent 
research finds that a loss of value-relevant information would occur.   
In addition, there is no assurance provided by current research that conforming the 
incomes would in fact reduce the amount of tax sheltering. If all participants know that the 
income reported is that on which the firm’s tax is computed, it will no longer be relied upon as 
heavily as a performance measure.
7 As a result, management will not want to overstate the 
amount and will only want to understate it in order to reduce the tax liability and maximize after-
tax cash flows to increase shareholder value.
8 Thus, while likely preventing financial accounting 
                                                 
7 Firms could voluntarily continue to disclose information about their earnings performance similar to current 
financial accounting income. While this is true, the information that would be disclosed would not be computed 
under a common set of rules and the firms could voluntarily disclose different information (or pieces of information) 
to different parties at different times. This type of reporting will invariably result in less reliable and comparable 
information and to an information disadvantage to certain groups of investors (most likely small investors). The 
disadvantaged investors will either a) leave the market or b) demand a higher return for the now higher risk of 
investing. This will in turn make equity more expensive because of a greater amount of information asymmetry and 
lower amount of liquidity. 
8 We discuss evidence from international settings with regard to this point below as well as U.S. evidence in 
Guenther et al. (1997).    6 
overstatement on the part of management, tax sheltering would still occur and a minimized 
income number will not convey the desired information regarding performance to shareholders. 
We develop these ideas as follows. Section 2 describes how taxable income and financial 
accounting income are currently computed, the differences between the two incomes, and how 
these differences are disclosed. Section 3 discusses the recent divergence between book and 
taxable income. Section 4 provides an overview of the proposed “solutions” for correcting this 
divergence. Section 5 covers in detail the issues specifically surrounding one proposed 
solution—conforming book and taxable incomes to one measure—including evidence from 
international settings, evidence on how the market uses the two income measures, and some 
further thoughts on a system of partial conformity. Section 6 concludes.       
 
 
2.  BOOK AND TAXABLE INCOME: HOW THEY ARE CALCULATED AND 
HOW THEY ARE DIFFERENT  
 
Management calculates corporate income for two external purposes each year. The first is 
for financial reporting purposes under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and 
the second is done in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to determine the 
corporation’s tax liabilities. Financial accounting income is intended to provide outside 
stakeholders (e.g., investors, creditors, regulators, etc.) with information about firm performance. 
In contrast, the objectives of the IRC are to provide a framework for efficient and equitable 
determination of tax liabilities and the subsequent collection of revenue, and to provide 
incentives for firms to engage in, or not engage in, particular activities, and to reward particular 
constituencies (Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, and Shevlin 2002; Manzon and Plesko 
2002).    7 
Despite both book and taxable income being prepared on an accrual basis, differences 
between book and taxable incomes can be large.
9 Some differences, known as permanent 
differences, are items included in one measure of income but never included in the other.
10 The 
simplest example is municipal bond interest that is included in financial accounting income but is 
excluded from taxable income.  
Other book-tax differences are temporary. Temporary differences arise because of 
differing requirements for the timing of recognition of income and expense items. For book 
purposes, revenue is recognized when earned and expense recognition is either matched against 
the related revenue or recorded in the accounting period in which the expense is incurred. For tax 
purposes, however, firms must “clearly reflect income.”
11 Revenue is generally recorded when 
cash is received and expenses may not be deducted until more stringent conditions are satisfied, 
reducing the level of discretion in the calculation of taxable income.  
The simplest example of a temporary difference is depreciation. For tax purposes, a firm 
depreciates its assets using the MACRS (modified accelerated cost recovery system) method 
which allows the write-off of an asset at a much faster rate than the most commonly used method 
for financial accounting, straight-line depreciation. Another example is bad debt expense. Under 
GAAP firms are required to estimate the proportion of sales that will ultimately become 
uncollectible and expense this amount in the same period as the recognition (inclusion) of the 
sale in revenue, thus reducing profits and the associated asset account to estimated net realizable 
value. For tax purposes, however, firms are required to use the specific write-off method and 
                                                 
9 For a very readable and extensive discussion on the differences between taxable income and book income see 
Knott and Rosenfeld (2003). 
10 Technically, the term “permanent difference” is not used in Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 109 
(SFAS 109). However, permanent-type differences continue to impact the calculation of current tax expense under 
SFAS 109 (KPMG 1992). 
11 IRC Section 446 (b).   8 
thus cannot deduct the estimated expense associated with the earned revenue but must wait until 
a specific receivable is known to be uncollectible before it can be written off (deducted). 
Similarly, for financial accounting purposes firms must estimate the cost associated with 
warranties and record this expense in the same period as the associated sale (thus, matching the 
expense with the revenue). However, for tax purposes estimates of future expenses cannot be 
deducted.  The firm must wait until the warranty claims are fulfilled before the deduction can be 
taken.       
Book-tax differences are disclosed to some extent on both the tax return and in the firm’s 
financial statements. A firm must reconcile its financial accounting income to its taxable income 
on the schedule M-1 of its tax return. However, because the M-1 was not thought to provide 
sufficient detail for the IRS to clearly tell why taxable income differed from financial reporting 
income, a new schedule M-3 is required for corporate tax returns filed for any taxable year 
ending on or after December 31, 2004.
12 Neither the M-1 nor the M-3 is publicly available.
13 
Firms are also required to disclose their material book-tax differences in the notes to their 
financial statements. The temporary book-tax differences are disclosed through the listing of the 
changes in material deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities and the permanent differences 
are disclosed in the reconciliation of the statutory tax rate to the firm’s effective (average) tax 
rate. While a detailed discussion of these disclosures is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
overall value of the disclosures in the financial statements is extremely limited because only the 
very large differences are listed, the descriptions are generally vague, and the description for the 
same item can vary substantially across firms. In addition, it is important to note that the tax 
                                                 
12 See Mills and Plesko (2003) and Boynton and Mills (2004) for more information surrounding the new M-3.  In 
addition, any book-tax difference greater than $10 million must be separately disclosed to the IRS under Treasury 
regulation §1.6011-4T. 
13 There have been some proposals that include making the M-3 public.  The M-3 data will be unavailable to the 
public (except possibly for a few specific agreements with a handful of academic researchers).    9 
provision on a firm’s income statement does not equal the taxes paid by the firm. Further, the 
actual tax liability of the firm is not publicly disclosed, it can be estimated but with the potential 
for measurement error (see Hanlon 2003 for more information on the problems with the tax note 
contained in financial statement disclosures).
14       
In summary, there are clear reasons why book and taxable incomes are different; most 
notably, because the incomes are not intended to serve the same purpose.  Financial accounting 
income is intended to provide information regarding firm performance to the marketplace while 
taxable income is prescribed by the government to meet budgetary needs and to provide 
incentives (disincentives) for desired (undesired) behavior. There are many items which can 
cause taxable income to differ from book income, some differences are permanent in nature and 
some are temporary, meaning the effect of the difference will reverse in the future. Finally, 
because of limited disclosures, investors and the IRS both have difficulty determining why 
taxable income is different than book income. 
 
3.  THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN BOOK AND TAXABLE INCOMES 
 
Many studies have concluded that the difference between book and taxable incomes was 
increasing throughout the late 1990s (we discuss these below). The divergence per se is not a 
concern, but what is a concern is that the cause of this divergence is unknown. The speculation is 
that it is caused by firm managers manipulating both incomes to achieve the best of both worlds: 
a high reported financial accounting income to shareholders and creditors designed to boost 
                                                 
14 See also McGill and Outlsay (2002 and 2004) who examine some of the recent tax shelter cases to show that 
financial statement disclosures are limited with regard to information about a firm’s tax status.     10 
market value and a low reported taxable income designed to boost cash flows (by lowering tax 
payments) and reported financial accounting earnings (due to a lower tax expense).
15  
This divergence has been measured and analyzed in a variety of ways yet all reach very 
similar conclusions. One early analysis was done by the U.S. Treasury (1999). The Treasury 
examined Schedule M-1 reconciliations of book to taxable income and concluded that the 
evidence “suggests that the difference between book income and taxable income has increased 
recently” (p. 32). They calculate a ratio of aggregate pre-tax book income to aggregate taxable 
income and find that this ratio was 1.82 in 1995 and 1.86 in 1996, both of which are substantially 
above the average of 1.25 during the 1990-1994 period. In Figure 1, we include a copy of a 
Treasury graph showing this increasing book-tax gap between 1992-1996.   
These Treasury results have been replicated with publicly available data (Plesko 2000; 
Manzon and Plesko 2002; Desai 2003) and extended with tabulated tax return data (Mills et al. 
2002; Plesko 2002; Plesko 2004). The results of these studies agree with those of the Treasury -- 
the difference between book and taxable incomes increased in the late 1990s. We have included 
a figure from Plesko (2004) figure showing the book-tax gap (see Figure 2). 
Yin (2003) evaluates the validity of the concerns over the book-tax gap by calculating 
effective tax rates (defined in Yin (2003) as current tax expense/pre-tax book income) and 
examines these rates over time for the S&P 500. Yin argues that many of the measures used in 
the prior studies may not be meaningful for corporations with significant foreign investment and 
are confounded by the potentially large book-tax difference created by the exercise of non-
qualified stock options. Thus, Yin (2003) uses a different measure, the effective tax rate, but 
                                                 
15 For example, Desai (2004) uses anecdotal evidence from major corporate scandals (Enron, Tyco, and Xerox) to 
show that managers exploit the differences between book and tax reporting opportunistically thereby reducing the 
quality of corporate earnings measures for both book and tax purposes.   
   11 
finds very similar results. He finds that the effective tax rates of the S&P 500 firms fell, on 
average, almost steadily throughout the six-year period 1995-2000 from 28.85% in 1995 to 
24.20% in 2000. After adjusting for the effect of the large book-tax difference created by the 
exercise of non-qualified stock options he finds that the effective tax rates of the sample 
decreased from 30.11% in 1995 to 27.98% in 2000, a 7.1% decline.    
Also using a measure of tax liability to total income, the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) reports that 94% of U.S. controlled corporations and 89% of foreign controlled 
corporations reported tax liabilities of less than 5% of their total income.  The GAO found 
similar results for large corporations (defined as those with at least $250 million in assets or $50 
million in gross receipts).
16  
To further verify and more importantly to update this book-tax gap through 2003, we 
present data based on financial statement information showing book and estimated taxable 
incomes over time in Table 1 and in Figures 3 and 4.
17 The sample is taken from the merged 
dataset of the Compustat and CRSP databases. We exclude financial institutions (SIC codes 
6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) because they operate in highly regulated 
industries and face a different set of tax and/or book rules than other firms. We also eliminate 
non-U.S. corporations and any firm-year observation in which the fiscal year changes in order to 
insure that observations are comparable across years. Our measure of financial accounting 
income is pre-tax book income. Our measure of taxable income is estimated by summing current 
federal income tax expense (Compustat data item 63) and current foreign tax expense (data item 
64) to derive current tax expense, which is then divided by the top U.S. statutory tax rate 
                                                 
16 The data for the GAO study are from the IRS’s Statistics of Income (SOI) samples of corporate tax returns for tax 
years 1996-2000. 
17 Note that our estimated taxable income is based on financial statement information and thus, subject to 
considerable measurement error.  This should be considered when evaluating the results –these are only estimated 
figures for taxable income.     12 
applicable to that data year, from which result we subtract the change in net operating loss 
carryforwards.
18 
Table 1 shows the aggregate amounts of pre-tax book income and estimated taxable 
income for the sample. In addition, the fourth column provides the difference between the two 
income measures.
19 The final column is the ratio of pre-tax book income to taxable income 
analogous to the ratio used by the Treasury in its 1999 report on tax shelters. While this ratio 
shows considerable variation over time, in general one can see that it is higher in the late 1990s 
than in the early part of the decade. The ratio then decreases significantly in 2001 and 2002 
before increasing again in 2003. Figures 3 and 4 present the data in Table 1 in graphical form. 
Overall, the data reveal that the aggregate book-tax difference turns positive (aggregate 
book income is greater than aggregate estimated taxable income) in 1994 and peaks in 1999. In 
the year 2001 the aggregate book-tax difference is markedly negative, that is, aggregate book 
income is actually less than aggregate estimated taxable income, consistent with results reported 
by Hanlon, Kelley and Shevlin (2004; hereafter HKS) and Plesko (2004). HKS find that the 
negative book-tax difference is due to large negative special items (totaling $267,847 million for 
the sample).
20 Likewise, Plesko (2004) reports that the aggregate negative book-tax difference in 
his results is driven by loss firms (see our Figure 2). However, the difference in 2003 becomes 
                                                 
18 Our pre-tax book income is derived by deducting minority interest (Compustat data item 49) from pre-tax book 
income (data 170).  Note that pre-tax book income (and estimated taxable income) includes the effects of special 
items (which the effects of the September 11 attacks are likely classified as) but excludes the effects of extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations. In the calculation of estimated taxable income, we subtract the change in the 
year-end net operating loss (NOL) carryforward because we require an estimate of the firm’s taxable income (or 
loss) for the year prior to the effects of any carryback or carryforwards.  
19 Our measure of the difference between book and taxable income does not include the book-tax difference for non-
qualified stock options, discussed more fully below. 
20 To obtain further information on these special items, we hand-collect the financial statements for 10 firms in the 
year 2001 from the HKS sample that have a large negative difference between book and taxable incomes (i.e., 
taxable income is greater than financial accounting income).  We find that the majority of the negative special items 
for these firms are the following (or a combination of the following): 1) write down for the impairment of goodwill 
and other intangible assets, 2) restructuring charges, and 3) the write-off of acquired in-process research and 
development.    13 
positive again and in fact is at its highest level since 1986. While this may indicate that 2001 was 
likely an anomaly and the overall trend is an increasing one, future analysis will be required as it 
is difficult to interpret the increase in only one year.  
Thus, there seems to be little debate that a large book-tax gap exists in the post Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 years, especially in the late 1990s. What there is disagreement about is the 
cause(s) of this increase and what, if anything, to do about it. For example, Yin (2003) states that 
it is uncertain whether the divergence is caused by firms simply making greater use of known 
provisions creating book-tax differences or if firms “increasingly overstated the amounts of their 
book income or understated the amounts of their tax liability (whether due to tax shelters or other 
causes)” (p. 1798). Manzon and Plesko (2002) are also noncommittal in their conclusions after 
attempting to model and explain firms’ book-tax differences.
21 They state that they “interpret any 
unexplained residual as attributable to other factors, one of which may be tax shelter activity” (p. 
177). Desai (2003) examines the divergence between book and taxable incomes and traces the 
discrepancy to the differential treatment of depreciation, the reporting of foreign source income, 
and the differences attributable to non-qualified employee stock options and finds that these 
items cannot fully explain the difference. He argues that the residual difference is likely due to 
tax shelter activity.  
While not the focus of this paper, the book-tax difference created by non-qualified stock 
options (NQOs) warrants some attention because several researchers have singled out this item 
as a potential driving factor in the increasing book-tax gap (e.g., Yin 2001; Desai 2003).
22  For 
                                                 
21 Manzon and Plesko’s (2002) model includes sales growth, property, post retirement benefits, foreign pre-tax 
income, lagged book-tax differences and others.  
22 A non-qualified employee stock option is one of two types of employee stock option (ESO).  The other type is an 
incentive stock option (ISO), or qualified option.  An ISO is an option that qualifies for treatment under IRC 
sections 421-424.  Non-qualified options constitute the vast majority of stock option grants. Much of this discussion 
about the stock option treatment is from Hanlon and Shevlin (2002) and Hanlon (2003).   14 
financial accounting purposes, an expense for stock option compensation was not required in any 
of the years analyzed in the above mentioned studies. The accounting rules in place during those 
years encourage firms to recognize as compensation expense the fair value (i.e., the estimated 
value determined from an option pricing model such as the Black-Scholes model or the binomial 
option pricing model) of employee stock options (ESOs) at the measurement date (the date on 
which both the exercise price and number of options are known), but allows firms to continue 
accounting for ESOs by expensing the intrinsic value on the day of grant (zero for most 
firms).
23,24 
  In contrast to financial accounting, for tax purposes, NQOs entitle the granting firm to a 
deduction equal to the amount of ordinary income recognized by the employee on the exercise 
date.
25 Thus, the ESO tax deduction equals the intrinsic value (market price less the strike price) 
at exercise. 
As a result, for NQOs most firms obtain a tax deduction in the exercise year but never 
recognize compensation expense for financial reporting purposes. Thus, a difference exists 
between book and taxable income.
26 This book-tax difference is not obvious, however, on 
financial statements because the rules  require that the tax benefits related to NQOs be accounted 
for as a credit to additional paid-in capital with an offsetting debit to income taxes payable (thus, 
                                                 
23 The rules are found in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 Accounting for Stock Based 
Compensation and the rules prior to that are found in Accounting Principles Board No. 25 Accounting for Stock 
Issued to Employees. The FASB has proposed rules to require the expensing of stock option compensation that are 
currently slated to be effective for financial statements beginning after June 15, 2005. 
24 Prior to the recent surge in firms electing to expense their option costs, there were only two firms in the Fortune 
500 that recognized compensation expense related to ESOs: Boeing and Winn Dixie.  However, since the recent 
accounting scandals many firms, such as Coca-Cola, Wal-Mart, Ford Motor Company, Home Depot, Bank One, and 
others have elected to account for their stock options using the fair value method.  
25 This deduction is provided for in Internal Revenue Code § 83(h) as a deductible expense as defined in §162.   
26 See Hanlon and Shevlin (2002) for additional discussion on the accounting treatment of the tax benefits of stock 
options.  It is important to note that even if firms elect or are required to expense stock options for financial 
accounting purposes, there is still a difference in the timing and amount for book versus tax treatment.     15 
no reduction to tax expense).
27 Yin (2001) and Desai (2003) continue to find an increasing book-
tax gap even after excluding this potentially large book-tax difference (as do we). 
The accounting for stock options is a fruitful example of how Congress will likely get 
involved if book and tax incomes are conformed in the U.S. The question of whether to expense 
stock options has been a politically controversial issue for years with Congress getting involved 
with the rulemaking for financial reporting purposes. For example, in 1993 Senator Feinstein 
(California) introduced a bill to block the FASB’s plan to require expensing of the fair value of 
stock option grants. In 1994, Senator Lieberman (Connecticut) introduced legislation that would 
have eliminated the FASB’s independence by requiring the SEC to approve all new FASB 
standards. The FASB responded by not requiring firms to expense stock options. This is an 
ongoing issue. As the FASB attempts to respond to the recent accounting scandals and the 
International Accounting Standards Board’s stance that stock option grants are compensation and 
should be expensed, they are again met with opposition from Congress. In 2004, a bill was 
passed in the House of Representatives that essentially requires firms to ignore any new FASB 
standard requiring the expensing of stock options for other than the top five executives of the 
firm (House Bill H.R. 3574, the Stock Option Accounting Reform Act). With this level of 
involvement in financial accounting rulemaking under a dual reporting system, it is likely that 
Congress will not concede the rulemaking for their revenue to an independent board and will 
have direct, and probably total, control over the rulemaking under a conformed income system. 
We discuss the experience in this regard of other countries that have more closely aligned book 
and taxable incomes in section 5.2.1. 
                                                 
27 The Board’s reasoning was that the tax benefits are related to a capital transaction with the owners of the company 
rather than a transaction related to income (see APB No. 25 para. 17).     16 
In sum, there is evidence of a growing gap between book income and taxable income, 
however, there is little compelling evidence on precisely what is causing this divergence. Most 
speculate that it is either firms generally managing their earnings upward or using tax shelters to 
manage their taxable income downward. As a result, the proposed fixes to the problem of the 
growing gap generally seek to address both issues. We examine the proposed fixes next. 
   
4.  PROPOSED FIXES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM  
 
There have been three main proposed fixes to the problem of the diverging incomes. 
First, is the disclosure of the entire corporate tax return. For example, on July 8, 2002 Senator 
Charles Grassley (R-IA), then ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, wrote a letter 
to the SEC and the Treasury Department raising the question of whether government regulators 
and the public might benefit if corporate tax returns were made public. He asked whether 
corporate governance would be improved if corporations’ tax returns were available to the SEC 
and whether shareholders and employees would benefit if tax returns were publicly available.
28 
Second, is the disclosure of limited tax return information such as the amount of taxable income. 
In April, 2003, Representative Lloyd Doggett (D-TX) introduced a bill that provided for public 
disclosure of certain corporate tax return information such as corporate taxable income and 
income tax shown on the return, the amount of federal income tax expense on the company’s 
annual report, the company’s adjusted book income, and certain items causing the discrepancy 
between tax and book income.    
A thorough discussion of these first two options, publicly disclosing tax returns and 
publicly disclosing limited tax information, is provided by LSS and the interested reader is 
                                                 
28 We note that the SEC can gain access to tax returns because IRC §6103(i)(3) permits the IRS to disclose certain 
otherwise confidential tax information to other federal agencies if the information may constitute evidence of a 
violation of any federal criminal law.   17 
directed there. In sum, the authors in their (tentative) conclusions support the second of these 
proposals (i.e., the disclosure of total tax liability and other specific items from the tax return) 
but do not support the disclosure of entire tax returns. They argue against the first proposal 
because of their concern that the disclosure of the entire tax return could cause companies to 
dilute the information content of the returns, hampering tax enforcement, and might, even in 
diluted form, reveal proprietary information that could provide a competitive advantage to those 
companies that are not required to make such a disclosure. They support the revelation of taxable 
income and other items, however, because this would “contribute to the transparency of the tax 
system by clarifying the tax payments of corporations in and of themselves, relative to other 
corporations, and relative to the income they report on their financial statements” (p. 827).  
The third proposed solution is to conform the two incomes into one measure or have 
partial conformity by reducing the number of allowable book-tax differences. In addition to the 
calls for conformity by Yin (2001) and Desai (2004), the Treasury in its report suggests using 
“…book income as a floor on the corporation’s taxable income. This would eliminate the book-
tax disparity, and therefore would significantly limit the allure and benefit of corporate tax 
shelters to public corporations” (p. 116). In addition, Murray writes in the Wall Street Journal, 
“The gap can and should be narrowed. …The results would be a stronger incentive for 
companies to tell it like it is. If executives want to overstate income to fool shareholders, they’ll 
pay higher taxes as a result. If they are tempted to understate income in order to escape taxes, 
they’ll suffer with the shareholders. That kind of change in incentives would do far more to clean 
up corporate accounting than any amount of regulatory oversight” (October 8, 2002, A5 
“Narrowing Tax Gap Should be Priority of Next Congress”). Finally, Pam Olson, the former  
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, states “…we should also carefully consider   18 
eliminating some of the differences between book and tax reporting” (Hamilton and 
Radziejewska, 2003 Tax Notes, March 31, 2003, p. 1935). It is to this issue that we now turn. 
 
 
5.  ISSUES WITH CONFORMITY 
 
When considering conforming book and taxable incomes, one first must ponder how this 
would actually work. What income measure would be reported if the numbers are conformed? 
Would the new measure be the taxable income we have under the current system, or the financial 
accounting number, or alternatively, some hybrid number in between? In addition, who would 
govern the rulemaking for this new conformed income measure—Congress directly or an 
independent board such as the FASB under today’s structure?    
Our conjecture is that the new measure would approximate today’s taxable income 
number and rulemaking responsibility would be under the direction of Congress. If the 
conformed number is the one on which tax revenues will be based, we do not believe Congress 
will leave its determination up to an independent board unconcerned with the Treasury’s 
budgetary needs. Partial conformity, where both measures are retained but the differences 
between the two are significantly reduced, is also an option.
29  However, in light of George 
Stigler’s (1971) work where he discusses how regulators are often captured by the regulated 
enterprises, promoting the interests of the firms instead of the common good, we doubt a 
reduction in the differences would be successful (again, note the stock option controversy where 
the constituents of Congress have been very influential). Further, Hulse (1996) finds that often 
special tax treatment is included in legislation to obtain the vote of particular legislators and that 
$10.6 billion of such provisions were included in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Thus, a reduction 
of the book-tax differences is unlikely, at least in the long-run because differences would 
                                                 
29 We discuss this option further below.   19 
continually be added to satisfy special interest groups and constituencies. As a result, we discuss 
the costs and benefits of the proposal to conform the incomes with the underlying assumption 
being that if the two incomes are conformed the reported measure of income will be, or at least 
approach, the current measure of taxable income and the rulemaking will be done directly by 
Congress rather than an independent, private board.
30     
Before we examine the costs and benefits of conformity, we first note that this is not an 
entirely new concept.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 required a book income adjustment in the 
calculation of a firm’s alternative minimum tax. This was the first time in U.S. tax history that a 
federal income tax liability was based partially on income derived explicitly from financial 
statements prepared in accordance with GAAP. The link was established to “ensure that no 
taxpayer with substantial economic income can avoid significant tax liability by using 
exclusions, deductions, and credits” (S. Rep. No. 99-313, at 518 (1986)). However, many 
speculated that firms would manage their financial accounting earnings in the years surrounding 
the change in the tax provisions in order to minimize their tax liabilities in those years. Further, 
some thought that the link weakened financial accounting. For example, acting Assistant 
Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy John Wilkens stated: 
The book income adjustment may be having a detrimental effect on the quality 
of financial reporting. The linkage between financial statement income and tax 
liability creates an incentive for corporations potentially subject to the AMT to 
apply generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in a way that reduces 
the  amount  of  net  book  income  subject  to  the  book  income  adjustment. 
Accordingly,  general  purpose  financial  statements  may  provide  distorted 
financial data to investors, creditors, and other nontax users… (U.S. Congress, 
House, June 8, 1989). 
 
                                                 
30 We admit that the FASB has also succumbed to political pressure in the past regarding the accounting for 
marketable securities, employee stock options, and business combinations. However, we argue that Congress 
exerted much of this pressure.  See Zeff (2002) for a discussion of each of these three issues and the politics 
involved. 
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However, the empirical evidence on this question of whether firms managed financial accounting 
earnings in order to minimize their tax liabilities is mixed with some studies finding that firms 
did manage financial accounting earnings in order to reduce taxes (e.g., Gramlich 1991 and 
Dhaliwal and Wang 1992) but with Choi et al., (1998) concluding that little evidence supports 
the AMT-driven income shifting.   
 
5.1       Potential Benefits of Conforming Book and Taxable Incomes 
Many argue that the temptation on the part of executives to mislead/lie for either financial 
accounting or taxable income purposes would be significantly reduced or even eliminated (Yin 
2001, Desai 2004, Carnahan and Novack 2002).  Executives would not be inclined to overstate 
income because this would result in higher taxes and they would not want to understate income 
because this would result in lower income reported to creditors and shareholders. In addition, it 
would, many argue, simplify a currently very complex reporting environment.  
A second potentially important benefit of conforming the income measures is that 
corporations would incur less compliance cost as they would report (essentially) the same 
measure to both the IRS and the SEC. As an example of the magnitude of the costs incurred 
currently under the dual reporting system, in 2003 the total revenues for the four largest 
accounting firms for auditing and advisory services was $9.6 billion and total revenues for tax 
services for these firms was $5.5 billion.
31 Together this is approximately 3% of the total 
reported earnings of the firms in the S&P 500 index.
32 Another example of the costs is found in 
                                                 
31 From Public Accounting Report’s Top 100. 
32 Reported earnings for the S&P 500 for the four quarters in 2003 was $450.38 billion (source: Standard and Poor’s 
S&P 500 Earnings and Estimate Report at www.standardandpoors.com). We note that in some sense this is a lower 
bound estimate of the costs firms incur as these figures are only for the largest four accounting firms and do not 
include the in-house and other costs required to comply with the IRS regulations and FASB and SEC standards. 
However, on the other hand, this calculation may overstate the compliance costs of two systems because it includes   21 
Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996). The authors surveyed 1,329 of the largest corporations in the 
U.S. in 1992 and find the average annual cost of compliance for federal and subfederal corporate 
income tax reporting is $1.565 million, implying an aggregate compliance cost of over $2 
billion.    
 
5.2  Potential Costs of Conforming Book and Taxable Incomes 
  There are potential costs to conforming the incomes as well.  Most notably, is the loss of 
information to the financial markets. There is a long line of literature in the U.S. demonstrating 
the value relevance and information content of financial accounting earnings and earnings 
announcements, beginning with Beaver (1968) and Ball and Brown (1968).
33 Thus, if our 
conjecture is correct and taxable income is the income measure that is used after the two incomes 
are conformed, financial accounting earnings will no longer be available resulting in a loss of 
information to the capital markets. More specifically, the loss of information would occur 
because, as LSS discuss, many accruals that financial accountants use to reflect current economic 
                                                                                                                                                           
foreign and state related amounts as well as audit (i.e., checking the books, the internal controls, etc.) costs which 
presumably occur under either system. 
33 See Kothari (2001) for an extensive review of the literature examining the capital market’s use of accounting 
information. In addition, there have been several studies examining the information content of financial accounting 
earnings over time using short-window event study methodology. All of these short window studies find results 
consistent with the information content of earnings remaining constant or slightly increasing over time (e.g., 
Landsman and Maydew 2002; Lo and Lys 2000). There have been some long window studies that show that the 
value relevance of accounting earnings has decreased over time (e.g., Collins, Maydew and Weiss 1997, Brown, Lo 
and Lys 1999). One explanation for this is that there is an increasing number of firms reporting losses. For example, 
Joos and Plesko (2004) report that in the 1970s only 15% of the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database reported a 
loss but by the 1990s about 35% of the observations are losses. In addition, Skinner (2004) discusses changes in 
reported earnings over the last 25 years and argues that recent research documents that there has been a large 
increase in the frequency and magnitude of losses (in 2001 aggregate earnings were a negative $110 billion with 
59% of firms reporting losses). Further, Fama and French (2004) find that after 1979 the characteristics of new lists 
change. For example, they argue that weaker firms with more distant expected payoffs became more viable 
candidates for public financing in the last 25 years. This increase in loss firms is important because losses are 
known to be less informative about a firm’s future prospects (and thus less related to a firm’s value) than are profits 
(Hayn 1995). However, conforming the incomes will not likely improve this situation because earnings under a 
conformed system will likely be much more conservative in an attempt to save tax dollars (Joos and Lang 1994). 
Based on prior research (e.g., Ali and Hwang 2000), these more conservative earnings will likely be less value 
relevant than currently reported financial accounting earnings.    
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performance would be eliminated if the incomes are conformed. One example is bad debt 
expense. As discussed above, under GAAP this expense is estimated and matched to the 
associated revenues while for tax purposes the deduction is not taken until the account receivable 
actually is known to be uncollectible. If this book-tax difference is removed and the tax treatment 
prevails, then profits and assets will be overstated in the period of the sale because one of the 
costs of generating the sale will not be properly matched to the revenue. Thus, this year’s profit 
will appear high while future periods will have to absorb the related expenses.  
 
5.2.1. Value relevance of financial accounting earnings in international settings   
  As discussed above, prior research has well established that financial accounting earnings 
in the U.S. are value relevant. Several recent studies investigate the value relevance of 
accounting earnings across countries including countries that have a high level of association 
between financial accounting and tax incomes. This research provides indirect, but important 
evidence on the potential loss of information if the U.S. would conform book and tax incomes to 
one measure.  
The closest study providing information on the issue is Ali and Hwang (2000), which 
examines the relation between measures of the value relevance of financial accounting data and 
several country-specific factors. Value relevance is defined as the relevance (importance) of 
accounting earnings to investors in the pricing of stocks – we discuss empirical 
operationalization of the concept in section 5.2.2 below.  The country specific factors examined 
by Ali and Hwang (2000) include the degree to which tax rules influence financial accounting 
measurements, the involvement of a private sector body in the standard setting process, and 
whether the country has a bank-oriented or market-oriented financial system. Ali and Hwang   23 
(2000) find that value relevance of earnings is lower when tax rules significantly influence 
financial accounting measurements. This result is consistent with tax laws being influenced by 
political, social, and economic objectives rather than the information needs of investors. This 
evidence would lead to the prediction that if book and tax incomes are conformed in the U.S., 
there would be a loss of value-relevant information in the capital markets.  
  The authors also find that value relevance of financial accounting earnings is lower for 
countries where private-sector bodies are not involved in the standard-setting process. This 
finding is consistent with the premise that government standard setters establish financial 
accounting rules with the primary purpose of satisfying regulatory needs rather than providing 
performance information to investors. Thus, if under a conformed income regime, the FASB is 
eliminated and the government promulgates the rules for the conformed income measure, a loss 
of information to the market would result.  
Ali and Hwang (2000) also find that financial accounting data are less value-relevant 
when the financial system is more bank-oriented as compared to market-oriented.  This result is 
consistent with there being a lower demand for published value-relevant financial reports 
because the banks have direct access to the financial information of the company. This is 
important to the proposal to conform incomes in the U.S. because under the condition where 
financial accounting income is not the conformed income measure as we conjecture, it is likely 
that information regarding performance will be obtained by interested parties through other 
methods. Indeed, Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) report that investors in countries that are more 
code oriented (i.e., where tax and book incomes are very closely linked) use other means (such 
as banking relationships and relationships with other major stakeholders) to obtain information 
about firm performance. Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) also find that valuation in these   24 
countries is much less related to reported earnings consistent with the findings of Ali and Hwang 
(2000).
34   
In addition to the value-relevance effects of linking tax and book incomes, studies also 
point to the more conservative nature of earnings when book and tax incomes are closely linked. 
For example, Joos and Lang (1994) in their study of the effects of accounting diversity across the 
European Union state that in those countries where the link is strong, “…the required conformity 
between financial and tax reporting has provided incentives to reduce taxes by reporting lower 
profits” (p 145).
35 Thus, linking the two incomes may indeed reduce the overstating of earnings 
for financial accounting.  However, based on the evidence in the research discussed above, the 
income number we would be left with would not be as useful for evaluating firm performance.  
 
5.2.2  A comparison of the value relevance of book and tax incomes 
  While there is an extensive literature on the value relevance of accounting earnings in the 
U.S. and several papers about the value relevance of accounting earnings across countries, there 
is little research examining the value relevance (or informational) role of taxable income. One 
recent paper that does is Hanlon, Kelley, and Shevlin (2004; HKS) which examines whether and 
to what extent information to stock market participants would be lost if financial accounting 
income is conformed to taxable income.   
  The study uses a sample of 66,678 U.S. firm-year observations over the period 1983-
2001 to conduct tests to assess the information content of book and estimated taxable incomes. 
                                                 
34 We note in addition to the loss of value relevance of earnings in this case, that it is not costless to investors and to 
the economy to develop other means for firm stakeholders to obtain information about firm performance. 
35 Consistent with the international findings, in a U.S. setting, Guenther, Maydew and Nutter (1997) find that for a 
unique set of publicly traded firms that were forced to switch for tax purposes from the cash method to the accrual 
method that requiring the use of the accrual method for tax (conforming taxable income closer to that of financial 
accounting income) causes firms to defer income (making income more conservative) for financial statement 
purposes.   
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Information content is measured by the ability of income to capture or summarize information 
that affects equity prices and returns. HKS use information from firms’ financial statements to 
estimate taxable income because taxable income is not publicly available. While there are some 
known estimation errors associated with using financial statements to estimate taxable income, 
for the purposes of their tests the financial statement number is more appropriate than the actual 
taxable income from tax return data (if such data were obtainable) because the market can only 
use the publicly available measure in pricing securities.
36 Specifically, the authors estimate 
(world-wide) taxable income by summing federal and foreign current income tax expense and 
dividing this by the top statutory tax rate for the applicable year. The authors then subtract the 
change in net operating loss carryforwards because they want the estimate of taxable income 
prior to the effects of any carryforwards of net operating losses. The study uses a 16-month long 
event window to calculate market-adjusted security returns and tests the association of these 
returns with both book (world-wide pre-tax financial accounting income) and estimated taxable 
incomes. More specifically, the return is the market-adjusted return for each firm defined as the 
compound (with dividend) return less the compound return on the value-weighted market 
portfolio. Returns are calculated over a 16-month period, starting at the beginning of the fiscal 
year and ending four months after the end of fiscal year so that all of the financial statement 
information is available to market participants.   
  The authors assess the relative information content of the income measures by regressing 
the buy-and-hold market adjusted return to the security over the 16-month return window on the 
change in each annual measure of income. The regression models are as follows: 
jt jt jt e PTBI a a R + D + = 1 0  
                                                 
36 See Hanlon (2003) for a discussion of the problems in using financial statement information to estimate taxable 
income and tax liabilities.    26 
jt jt jt e TI b b R + D + = 1 0  
where Rjt is the buy-and-hold market-adjusted return to each security, j, over the 16-month return 
window,
37 PTBI is pre-tax book income and TI is estimated taxable income. Each model is 
estimated annually.  A comparison of the annual R
 squareds allows the determination of which 
measure of performance, book income or taxable income, is more highly associated with stock 
returns in each year. The average annual R squared for the regression using the change in (pre-
tax) book income is 0.059 while the average annual R squared for the regression using the 
change in estimated taxable income is only 0.032.  Figure 5 plots the ratio of R
 squareds from 
HKS’s analysis. One can see that the ratio varies around 50% for most of the years, indicating 
that pre-tax book income exhibits higher explanatory ability (roughly twice as much in most 
years).  A formal comparison of the adjusted R squareds
 from the annual regressions is 
conducted using the Voung (1989) test. The results of the Voung test indicate that in all but three 
years of the sample period 1983-2001, book income exhibits significantly greater explanatory 
power than estimated taxable income.  Further, the average annual R
2 ratio is 0.547, which is 
significantly less than one based on its time-series variation. In sum, the results of this test are 
consistent with book income containing more information because it has a significantly higher 
explanatory power than estimated taxable income. 
  HKS also conduct a test of incremental information content, where changes in both 
measures of income are included in the same regression in which the dependent variable is the 
16-month market-adjusted security return. The estimated regression model is as follows: 
jt jt jt jt e TI c PTBI c c R + D + D + = 2 1 0  
                                                 
37 The authors use the value-weighted market index from CRSP to calculate market-adjusted returns.   27 
From this test an assessment can be made whether, given one measure of income, the other 
measure incrementally adds to the information set as reflected in security returns. This analysis 
most directly tests whether useful information would be lost if the two income measures become 
one. We present a summary of their results in Table 2. The authors find that book income has a 
significantly positive average annual coefficient (c1=0.55, t-stat of 18.87) as does estimated 
taxable income (c2= 0.28, t-stat of 7.65). Thus, both measures provide information incremental to 
the information provided by the other measure, which indicates that there would be a loss of 
information available to investors if only one of these two income measures was used.    
  In sum, the study shows that both book and tax measures of income provide information 
to investors but that the market appears to rely more on book income than taxable income as a 
measure of firm performance. The authors conclude from the study that if book income were 
conformed to taxable income that there would be an approximately 50% loss in the explanatory 
power of earnings. 
 
5.2.3  Potential effects of having taxable income available to the public 
  If our conjecture is correct that conformed income would resemble taxable income, there 
will likely be additional effects simply from having taxable income publicly disclosed. On one 
hand, public disclosure of taxable income may facilitate greater tax compliance because 
company executives may be concerned that if it is known that their taxable income is unusually 
low the public may react adversely.  Indeed, as LSS report, corporations’ concern with their 
public perception is evidenced by their charitable giving of $9.05 billion in 2001.  In addition, 
the public may boycott the products of companies thought to be poor corporate citizens (e.g., the 
Nike sweatshop controversy). Further, according to a survey of 2,594 adult Americans by Hill   28 
and Knowlton (2001), 79 percent of Americans said they consider good corporate citizenship 
when deciding whether to buy a particular company’s stock.  
  On the other hand, the revelation of corporate taxes may result in corporate competition 
based on taxes leading to a “race to the bottom” of tax rates (LSS). Already, websites such as 
CFO.com allow Chief Financial Officers to measure their company’s performance against peers 
on four dimensions one of which is tax efficiency (Desai 2004). Further evidence that suggests 
firms compete on this measure and use low taxes as a source of corporate profits is found in a 
recent GAO report which finds that 32.7% of large U.S. corporations reported no tax liability in 
1995 and that percentage increased to 45.3% by 2000 (GAO 2004).   
  Thus, while many argue that conforming the two income measures will yield more honest 
reporting for both book and tax purposes this result is not clear. Firms may just compete based 
on tax rates to pay low taxes yielding higher cash flows for shareholders. If this is the case, 
corporate over reporting on financial statements will not be such an issue, but investors will 
instead have very little information on which to evaluate firm performance. 
 
5.3  Partial Conformity 
There is also the possibility that rather than fully conforming the two income numbers, the 
number of book-tax differences allowed could be reduced. While this sounds reasonable on 
paper, in practice which differences would be disallowed? We state above that we think that 
before long with a reduced book-tax difference system we would be back to the current system 
with innumerable adjustments because the private interest groups and constituencies that   29 
lawmakers serve will demand special exceptions for their specific situations.
38 However, in this 
section we briefly examine some items that could potentially be conformed. 
The most obvious book-tax difference that could be conformed is that for depreciation.  
Financial accounting could adopt the tax method of depreciation, MACRS. This would result in 
many firms switching from straight-line depreciation to accelerated depreciation. It is unlikely 
that this would result in a loss of information to investors because economic depreciation of an 
asset does not follow either of these methods exactly.  In addition, the expected life of the asset 
could still be disclosed to investors.
39 Thus, this is one difference which could be eliminated with 
minimal cost in terms of revenue or information.
40  
Another item one could consider is deferred revenue. For financial accounting purposes an 
item of revenue is not recognized (i.e., it is deferred) if it is not earned or is not measurable. 
Thus, when software companies sell software with a service contract over a number of years, the 
revenue allocable to the service contract is not recognized in income until the service period 
expires.  For tax purposes, however, this revenue is taxed upon receipt. If the deferral method 
were adopted under both systems there would be a deferral of revenue for tax purposes resulting 
in a loss of government revenues (at a minimum in terms of present value) and measurement for 
tax done by subjective estimates. If the recognition upon receipt method were adopted under 
both systems, investors would be left without information regarding a liability of the firm (i.e., 
the services yet to be performed) and a firm could report revenues currently which are related to 
                                                 
38 Consistent with this view, a recent Wall Street Journal article states “Today’s tax code is complicated in part 
because politicians of both parties are quick to create tax breaks for their favorite causes” (Murray 2004). 
39 If the straight-line method most often used for financial accounting was adopted for taxation purposes there would 
be a revenue gain but a loss of a method of providing incentives for investment behavior.  Because additional 
incentives in excess of MACRS are often provided through depreciation methods (e.g., IRC Section 179 and the 
bonus depreciation rules following the 9/11 attacks) conforming to financial accounting depreciation would likely 
entail the greater cost. 
40 Under current GAAP rules, property is recorded at historical cost and this cost is allocated over the service period 
of the asset.  We note that using the MACRS system for depreciation would be consistent with a more fair value-
based approach to which financial accounting is moving in general.    30 
expenses that will not be incurred for several years, thus potentially misleading financial 
statement readers about firm performance. 
Another example is the allowance for doubtful accounts. If conformed to the tax method of 
allowing only specific write-offs, investors will not receive information from managers regarding 
the proportion of the current receivables that are expected to be uncollectible. However, if tax 
were to conform to the financial accounting method of estimating the amount to expense, the 
government would again suffer a revenue loss and be subject to deductions based on 
management expectations, which would be impossible to verify and audit.   
While the examples are endless, in general, most items will present a trade-off between  
information for investors and revenue and control for the government.  While there are some 
items (such as depreciation) where the loss of information may not be large if financial 
accounting converted to the tax method, and other items which could arguably be conformed 
while still providing information to external stakeholders (e.g., debt-equity hybrid securities and 
synthetic leases), the majority of book-tax differences would likely involve the aforementioned 
trade-off. A further item that warrants attention is the suggestion to eliminate many book-tax 
differences and then require firms to provide details in the notes to financial statements with 
additional information. However, there is a point at which a high level of disclosure becomes 
non-disclosure because time and funds are not infinite for investors (even sophisticated 
investors) to assimilate that much information. In addition, we note again that perhaps the 
greatest concern about the partial conformity plan is that we would soon be back to the current 
system because special interest groups and constituencies would lobby Congress to retain book-
tax differences important to them and these would be added continually through the years. 
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6.       CONCLUSIONS 
This paper discusses the issues surrounding the proposals to conform financial 
accounting income and taxable income. We review recent literature that sheds light on this 
proposal in order to inform the policy debate regarding what to do about the current reporting 
gap between financial accounting and taxable incomes.     
The expanding divergence between book and taxable incomes has attracted much 
attention and analysis in recent years. While there is little debate that the incomes are diverging, 
what is causing the divergence and whether and how to fix it are very much open questions. In 
general, there is no convincing evidence regarding exactly what is causing the increasing book-
tax gap.  However, most suspect that it is either due to firms managing financial accounting 
earnings upward, engaging in tax shelters in order to minimize taxable income, or both.  There 
have been three proposed solutions to the problem of the increasing divergence between the two 
incomes. We discuss the third proposal, the conforming of book and taxable incomes to one 
measure.   
We conjecture that upon conforming the incomes Congress will usurp FASB and will 
promulgate the rules for determining the new income measure. In light of this we consider both 
the potential costs and benefits of changing our dual reporting system to one in which 
corporations report the same income to shareholders and the IRS.  Potential benefits include 
lower compliance cost for reporting their income and the potential lowering of incentives to 
mislead the IRS and capital markets. The potential costs include the loss of value-relevant 
information to the capital markets by eliminating one measure of income with the greater loss 
coming from eliminating financial accounting earnings.  In addition, the extant empirical 
literature reveals that it is unlikely that having a system where financial accounting earnings and   32 
taxable income are conformed (or even closely linked) will result in a reduction of corporate tax 
shelters. In fact, the opposite may occur where there is a “race to the bottom” in terms of 
corporate tax rates and payments.   
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Table 1: 




YEAR PTBI TI DIFFERENCE PTBI/TI
1985 $138,904 $99,868 $39,036 1.39
1986 $130,162 $80,622 $49,539 1.61
1987 $167,736 $137,019 $30,716 1.22
1988 $191,108 $188,720 $2,388 1.01
1989 $191,130 $184,844 $6,286 1.03
1990 $192,730 $198,181 -$5,450 0.97
1991 $147,180 $180,259 -$33,078 0.82
1992 $162,516 $175,495 -$12,979 0.93
1993 $187,691 $204,951 -$17,261 0.92
1994 $279,280 $244,924 $34,357 1.14
1995 $325,822 $285,528 $40,294 1.14
1996 $370,463 $327,303 $43,160 1.13
1997 $383,911 $361,882 $22,029 1.06
1998 $355,245 $345,330 $9,915 1.03
1999 $444,745 $386,256 $58,489 1.15
2000 $486,431 $450,564 $35,867 1.08
2001 $125,049 $316,144 -$191,095 0.40
2002 $229,551 $246,048 -$16,497 0.93
2003 $462,055 $305,708 $156,347 1.51  
 
 
Notes to Table 1:  
All amounts are in millions. PTBI is pre-tax book income and is derived by deducting minority interest (Compustat 
data item 49) from pre-tax book income (data 170). TI is estimated taxable income and is estimated by summing 
current federal income tax expense (Compustat data item 63) and current foreign tax expense (data item 64) to 
derive current tax expense, which is then divided by the top U.S. statutory tax rate applicable to that data year, from 
which result we subtract the change in net operating loss (NOL) carryforwards.  More specifically TI is estimated as 
[(current federal +current foreign income tax expense)/str] - DNOL, where str is the top statutory tax rate 
applicable to that data year.  If federal current tax expense is missing we use total current tax expense (data 16-data 
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Table 2:   
Portion of Table 4 from Hanlon, Kelley, and Shevlin (2004) - Incremental Information 
Content 
Rjt = c0 + c1 ￿PTBIjt + c2 ￿TIjt + ejt        
 
Year   N   ￿PTBI  ￿TI 
1983       2,225  0.67*  0.50* 
1984       2,866  0.41*  0.23* 
1985       2,984  0.54*  0.12 
1986       2,933  0.59*  0.08 
1987       3,048  0.43*  0.16* 
1988       3,188  0.48*  0.19* 
1989       3,182  0.50*  0.03 
1990       3,140  0.43*  0.13* 
1991       3,180  0.43*  0.39* 
1992       3,238  0.61*  0.21* 
1993       3,454  0.64*  0.32* 
1994       3,741  0.60*  0.26* 
1995       3,999  0.83*  0.57* 
1996       4,233  0.59*  0.38* 
1997       4,544  0.62*  0.59* 
1998       4,449  0.34*  0.44* 
1999       4,258  0.53*  0.23* 
2000       4,077  0.79*  0.29* 
2001       3,939  0.47*  0.27* 
       
Average   0.55  0.28 
t-statistic    18.87  7.65 
 
Notes:  Rjt = the market-adjusted buy and hold return on security j cumulated over a 16-month window ending 4 
months following the end of fiscal year t.  ￿PBTI = the change in firm j’s pre-tax book income which is calculated as 
the first difference in pre-tax book income less minority interest, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning 
of period t. ￿TI = the change in firm j’s taxable income which is estimated by dividing the sum of federal and foreign 
tax expense by the maximum statutory tax rate, subtracting the ￿NOL carryforward, and then taking the first 
difference.  If this information is not available, ￿TI is calculated by dividing the difference of current tax expense and 
deferred taxes by the maximum statutory tax rate, subtracting ￿NOL carryforward, and then taking the first difference.  
Finally, the result is scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of period t. N is the number of observations 
used in estimating each annual regression. The t statistic is based on the annual deviation of the coefficient around its 















































































Graph of Pre-tax Book Income and Estimated Taxable Income 
 
 















Notes to Figure 3: 






































































Notes to Figure 4: 
















Plot of the Ratio of R Squareds from Tests of Relative Information Content from Hanlon, 





































Notes to Figure 5: 
The R squareds compared are from the following regressions: Rjt = a0 + a1￿PTBIjt + ejt  and  Rjt = b0 + b1￿TIjt + ejt 
where Rjt = the market-adjusted buy and hold return on security j cumulated over a 16-month window ending 4 
months following the end of the fiscal year t, ￿PBTI = the change in firm j' s pre-tax book income which is 
calculated as the first difference in pre-tax book income less minority interest, scaled by the market value of equity 
at the beginning of period t, ￿TI = the change in firm j’s taxable income which is estimated by dividing the sum of 
federal and foreign tax expense by the maximum statutory tax rate, subtracting the ￿NOL carryforward, and then 
taking the first difference. If this information is not available, ￿TI is calculated by dividing the difference of current 
tax expense and deferred taxes by the maximum statutory tax rate, subtracting ￿NOL carryforward, and then taking 
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